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1. INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 4 of his Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis, Ferenc Huoranszki 
offers the following account advertised in the title of the book:
HUORANSZKI’s conditional analysis of free will
S’s will is free wrt an unperformed action A iff
 S would have done A, if
(i) S had chosen to perform A, and
(ii) there is no change in S’s ability to perform A, and
(iii) there is no change in S’s ability to make a choice about whether to per-
form A.1
Conditional accounts of free will—like G. E. Moore’s, Thomas Hobbes’ and 
David Hume’s—echo a variant of clause (i) of this analysis. Why include the 
other two clauses—in particular, clause (ii)? It is here that a debate in metaphys-
ics and the philosophy of language, about dispositions, will prove relevant and 
instructive, providing interesting parallels, conceptual clarifications, and also ad-
ditional indirect support for Huoranszki’s conditional account of free will. 
About dispositions in a nutshell. Picture a slice of perishable chocolate cake: 
it has the disposition to spoil if left outside the refrigerator for a prolonged pe-
riod. But as things stand, the slice never spoils, for I gobble it up as soon as it’s 
purchased; still, while in existence, the slice retained this ever unactualized dis-
position of perishability. A highly influential account—defended, for example, 
by Gilbert Ryle, Nelson Goodman and W. V. Quine—has it that ascriptions of 
dispositions like perishability, water-solubility, fragility, and so on should be 
given a conditional analysis along the following lines: 
1  I use the standard abbreviations: ‘wrt’ stands for ‘with respect to’; ‘iff’ for the biconditional 
connective ‘if and only if’. For simplicity, the temporal qualification ‘S’s will is free at time t’ 
is left implicit throughout in this as well as other definitions. 
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SIMPLE conditional account of disposition ascriptions
An object/person/substance N is disposed to M under C iff
 N would M if 
(I) it were the case that C. 
That is, the slice of cake, while in existence, had the disposition to spoil under 
the condition of being left outside the fridge for a prolonged period just in case 
it would have spoiled had the condition obtained. 
Notice that clause (i) of HUORANSZKI and clause (I) of SIMPLE are extremely 
similar: both provide an analysis in terms of a subjunctive conditional (past- or 
present-tense, respectively) of the form ‘P would have been the case, if it were 
the case that C’ and ‘P would be the case if it were the case that C’.2 In Section 
4, we’ll see that the similarities run deeper than that: the difficulties emerging in 
the context of giving a conditional account of dispositions point the way toward 
further reasons to include a clause parallel to HUORANSZKI’s (ii) in the conditional 
analysis of disposition ascriptions. By way of stage setting, in Section 2, I will 
trace some of the reasons why Huoranszki departs from Moore’s classic version 
of the conditional analysis of free will. In Section 3, I will give some preliminar-
ies on conditional analyses of disposition ascriptions. Concluding remarks will 
follow in Section 5. Along the way, my aim is also to reconsider the role and 
interrelations of the various counterexamples to the sufficiency and necessity of 
the conditional analysis of disposition ascriptions; these constitute crucial clarifi-
cations not only for the dispositions debate but also for Huoranszki’s arguments 
for his version of the conditional analysis of free will.
2. CONDITIONALS AND FREE WILL
In developing his own conditional analysis of free will, Huoranszki (2011: sec-
tion 4.1) takes as his starting point Moore’s classic proposal (1912: 220–221), 
reconstructing it along the following lines:
MOORE’s conditional analysis of free will 
S’s will is free wrt an unperformed action A iff
(iƍ)  S would have done A, if S had chosen to perform A,
(iiƍ)  S could have chosen to make a choice about performing A, 
(iiiƍ) no-one can predict whether or not S chooses to perform A.
2  Throughout, I am assuming in the background Lewis’s (1973) possible worlds semantics 
for subjunctive conditionals, according to which, roughly, a conditional of the form P would 
be/would have been the case, if it were/had been the case that C’ is true iff all C-worlds (world 
in which C is true) most similar to the actual world are P-worlds (Lewis 1973).
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According to MOORE, (i’)–(iii’) are individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
for S to have free will with respect to performing an action. Of these, Huoran-
szki keeps (i’), finding fault with (ii’) and (iii’). Clause (ii’), he argues, leads to 
an infinite regress and also fails to be a necessary condition for having free will 
(a point argued for in Chapter 3 of his book). Clause (iii’), he argues, is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for having free will to perform an action: Huoranszki is 
free to refuse a bowl of zucchini soup even though those who know him well can 
easily predict his refusal; meanwhile, the unpredictability of events (like various 
weather phenomena) gives no guarantee whatsoever that they are free to occur. 
Huoranszki (2011: section 4.2) offers his own clauses (ii) and (iii), above, to 
provide what he considers an adequate conditional analysis of free will.3 His 
clause (i) is the same as (i’) in MOORE—we’ll henceforth refer to it simply as 
clause (i).4 But he thinks (i) by itself would be insufficient to define free will 
because of an objection of Keith Lehrer’s (1968/1982): it is logically possible that 
the very act of choosing or not choosing A affects one’s ability to perform the ac-
tion in question. HUORANSZKI’s clause (ii) is intended to block such a possibility. 
(HUORANSZKI’s clause (iii) is intended to block yet another counterexample of 
Lehrer’s which we won’t discuss here.)
Let’s spell out Lehrer’s objection to clause (i) in four steps: 
First step. It is logically possible that (1), (2) and (3) hold for some action a.
(1) s can perform a (in the sense of having free will wrt to a) only if s chooses 
to perform a. 
(2) s doesn’t choose to perform a.
(3) s would have done a if s had chosen to perform a. 
 
Second step. From (1) and (2) the modus tollens inference schema, below, 
yields (4): 
Modus tollens:
if P then Q (which is equivalent to P only if Q)
not Q
Therefore, not P 
3  Huoranszki’s broader aim is to use the conditional analysis to expose a problem with Peter 
van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument (discussed in Huoranszki’s Chapter 2), according to 
which from determinism it follows that our actions are not up to us. 
4  For ease of exposition, whenever it’s harmless in the context of the paper, I’ll be 
deliberately “sloppy” in glossing over discrepancies like the following: (i’) includes the 
conditional consequent while (i) doesn’t. 
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(4) s cannot perform a (in the sense of having free will wrt to a). 
Third step. (3) states that the action a satisfies clause (i). 
Fourth step. An action like a shows clause (i) to be insufficient to define free 
will, for a satisfies (i) (according to (3) above), yet the subject in question does 
not have free will wrt to a (according to (4) above). 
HUORANSZKI’s (ii) serves to exclude actions like a, for which (1) holds. We 
have so far left as abstract what an action fitting a’s parameters would be. Lehrer 
offers a far-fetched example: 
Suppose that, unknown to myself, a small object has been implanted in my brain, 
and that when a button is pushed by a demonic being who implanted this object, I 
became temporarily paralyzed and unable to act. My not choosing to perform an act 
might cause the button to be pushed and thereby render me unable to act. (Lehrer 
1968/1982: 44.)
In the context of dispositions (in Section 4), we’ll encounter some more realistic 
examples that are analogous to this one, along with close parallels between the 
conditional analyses of free will and of disposition ascriptions. 
We should note already that in his conditional analysis, Huoranszki propos-
es to construe freedom of the will as a special ability/unactualized power: the 
ability/power to act otherwise. Moreover, this very ability/power is featured in 
clause (ii), making the analysis nonreductive (a point that we will revisit in the 
last section). 
How do dispositions come into this picture? There are various ways we might 
understand disposition ascriptions like the following: “Huoranszki is disposed 
to ride a bike”; “This piece of cake is perishable”. We might take the first to 
mean, on the one hand, that Huoranszki is inclined/prone/has a tendency to ride 
a bike, or, on the other hand, that he has a power/ability to do so. Huoranszki is 
interested in this latter sense of ‘is disposed to…’ and other dispositional predi-
cates (‘is perishable/fragile/edible/lethal’ etc.). Notice that this is a natural move, 
given that many claims about dispositions don’t involve habit or recurrence: a 
cake’s edibility does not mean it can be eaten more than once, a cup’s fragility 
does not mean it can break more than once, and a poison capsule’s being lethal 
doesn’t mean it can kill more than once. We are thus looking at analyzing dis-
positional predicates in the sense of “a substance’s, an object’s, or a person’s 
power to behave in certain ways in certain kind of circumstances, even if they never 
behave that way” (Huoranszki 2011: 60; emphases in the original). This is the 
sense of ‘is disposed to’ that we aim to capture via a conditional analysis.
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If we construe dispositional predicates as referring to abilities/powers, and 
freedom of the will as the ability/power to act otherwise, then—unless there 
are reasons warranting special treatment for the latter—MOORE is a specific 
application of a general, conditional-based account of disposition ascriptions. 
In this case, an analog of Lehrer’s counterexample to clause (i) should also 
arise for a conditional account of disposition ascriptions. According to Huoran-
szki (2011: 61–63), the conditional account of dispositions is indeed subject 
to a Lehrer-analog counterexample, which serves to point us in the right direc-
tion about how clause (i) should be supplemented: by including clause (ii) of 
HUORANSZKI. 
Let’s see how various counterexamples, the Lehrer-analog one included, 
have shaped the discussion about conditional analyses of disposition ascriptions. 
Setting right the roles and interconnections of the various counterexamples 
does, I think, shed light on the dispositions debate and carries ramifications for 
Huoranszki’s line of argument for his own account of free will.
3. CONDITIONALS AND DISPOSITIONS: MASKS AND MIMICKS
It is widely assumed that all dispositional predicates can be understood as in-
volving a condition of manifestation: for example, ‘is perishable’ is about being 
disposed to spoil under a certain condition, say, being left out of the fridge for 
an extended period. This way, all disposition ascriptions fall under the SIMPLE 
conditional analysis of dispositions, repeated here: 
SIMPLE conditional account of disposition ascriptions
An object/person/substance N is disposed to M under C iff
 N would M if 
 (I) it were the case that C. 
A battery of counterexamples challenge this analysis from two directions. 
Some counterexamples call into question whether the analysis provides neces-
sary conditions: the first half of the biconditional in SIMPLE might be true while 
the second is false, showing that the truth of the second half is not necessary for 
the truth of the first half; call these anti-necessity T–F counterexamples. For 
a porcelain cup to be fragile—to be disposed to break when dropped, say—it 
is not necessary that the cup would break if dropped. This is shown by mask-
ing cases: if the fragile cup has suitable protective packaging, it remains fragile, 
yet it would not break if it were dropped and all other circumstances remained 
maximally similar to actuality (including the packaging). The packaging is an 
extrinsic feature that masks the cup’s disposition to break (Johnston 1992: 233; 
see also Bird 1998). 
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Some counterexamples indicate that SIMPLE fails to provide sufficient condi-
tions: the first half of the biconditional in SIMPLE might be false while the second 
half is true, showing that the truth of the second half is not sufficient for the 
truth of the first half; call these anti-sufficiency F–T counterexamples. A non-
fragile object might be such that it would break when dropped. This is shown 
by mimicking cases (discussed also by A. D. Smith 1977: 441, 444):
A gold chalice is not fragile but an angel has taken a dislike to it because its garish-
ness borders on sacrilege and so has decided to shatter it when it is dropped. Even 
though the gold chalice would shatter when dropped, this does not make it fragile 
because something extrinsic to the chalice is the cause of the breaking. (Johnston 
1992: 232.) 
When a styrofoam dish is struck, it makes a distinctive sound. When the Hater of 
Styrofoam hears this sound, he comes and tears the dish apart by brute force. So, 
when the Hater is within earshot, styrofoam dishes are disposed to end up broken 
if struck. (Lewis 1997: 153.) 
Because of the angel, an extrinsic factor, the chalice mimicks the behavior of a 
fragile object without being fragile. Because of the Styrofoam Hater, an extrinsic 
factor, the styrofoam dish mimicks the behavior of an object disposed to break 
when struck, without having that disposition.
David Lewis (1997) appealed to intrinsic properties in his influential reformed 
analysis, which is thought to handle some of the counterexamples against SIM-
PLE. His justification was that plausibly, “dispositions are an intrinsic matter” 
(Lewis 1997: 147)—their causal bases are properties that are intrinsic to the ob-
ject (Lewis 1997: 155); for example, a porcelain cup’s fragility is due to its in-
trinsic properties, as is a gold chalice’s non-fragility. (Lewis argues that without 
the intrinsicness restriction on properties, we would run into the problem that 
the chalice itself has the disposition to break.)5 Below I have simplified Lewis’s 
proposal along the lines of Sungho Choi – Michael Fara (2012: section 1.4):
5  Lewis (1997: 155) offers an ordinary example of his own (an analogous line can be made 
about the porcelain cup with protective packaging):
… to placate those who will not be convinced by fantastic examples, I offer the case 
of Willie. Willie is a dangerous man to mess with. Why so? Willie is a weakling and a 
pacifist. But Willie has a big brother—a very big brother—who is neither a weakling 
nor a pacifist. Willie has the extrinsic property of being protected by such a brother; 
and it is Willie’s having the extrinsic property that would cause anyone who messed 
about with Willie to come to grief. If we allowed extrinsic properties to serve as causal 
bases of dispositions, we would have to say that Willie’s own disposition makes him a 
dangerous man to mess about with. But we very much do not want to say that. We want 
to say instead that the disposition that protects Willie is a disposition of Willie’s brother. 
And the reason why is that the disposition is an intrinsic property of Willie’s brother. 
(Emphasis in the original.)
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INTRINSIC-property-based conditional account of disposition ascriptions
An object/person/substance N is disposed to M under C iff
there is an intrinsic property B that N has such that C and B would 
jointly cause N to M, if
(I) it were the case that C, and 
(II) N were to retain B for a sufficient time.
According to Michael Fara (2009), INTRINSIC …
… avoids the problem of “mimicking”… It is true that the gold chalice, watched 
over by the destructive angel, would shatter if it were dropped. But the chalice has 
no intrinsic property which would contribute to causing the shattering—the angel 
alone would cause the chalice to shatter. (Fara 2009: section 2.3.)
Fara is suggesting that the chalice no longer presents an F–T counterexample 
given the amendments in INTRINSIC, because the second half of the bicondi-
tional in INTRINSIC comes out false (as does the first half): no intrinsic property 
of the chalice contributes to causing the shattering.6 
We might, however, think it is unclear that INTRINSIC avoids the chalice coun-
terexample. For we might reason: the chalice does have an intrinsic property p 
giving rise to the chalice’s extreme garishness, and p causes the angel’s wrath, in 
turn causing the shattering of the chalice; and with p, we can make the second 
half of the biconditional true, bringing back the original F–T problem the chal-
ice had presented for SIMPLE. I find this objection to Fara compelling; it draws 
support from two considerations. 
First, just one paragraph later, Fara points out that the T–F masking coun-
terexample with the packaged porcelain cup remains unresolved by INTRINSIC, 
for the biconditional’s first half remains true (the cup is still fragile/disposed to 
break when dropped) while the second half is still false: 
the cup does have an intrinsic property which would join with the dropping in 
causing it to shatter if the packing were absent. But since the packing isn’t absent (and 
wouldn’t be absent if the cup were dropped), the [second half of the biconditional], 
in this instance, is false. (Fara 2009: section 2.3; emphases in the original.)
6  Fara’s is a far more plausible take on Lewis’s example of Willie protected by the brother 
who is dangerous to mess with (in the previous footnote): the second side of INTRINSIC comes 
out false the same way as the first if we substitute “Willie is disposed to be dangerous under 
the condition of being messed with”; for there is arguably no intrinsic property of Willie’s to fit 
the analysis. Willie’s case, formerly a counterexample to SIMPLE, is no longer such. (But even 
if we were to accept this, the chalice case would still remain a counterexample to INTRINSIC.)
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But if an extrinsic factor like the packaging material remains in place when 
evaluating the subjunctive conditional (because the conditional’s antecedent 
instructs us to consider worlds in which there is no departure from the actual 
world except for the cup being dropped, so all worlds under consideration retain 
the packaging), making the biconditional’s second half false, then in the chalice 
example, we likewise have no grounds for excluding the vengeful angel’s pres-
ence from the worlds under consideration (angelless worlds would constitute 
a gratuitous departure from actuality), and, in all such worlds, the chalice does 
break (thanks to the angel), so the second half of INTRINSIC comes out true, con-
trary to Fara’s point that it is clearly false. The chalice example does, after all, 
remain an F–T anti-sufficiency counterexample.
Second, the following quote from a substantially revised version of Fara (2009) 
discusses the second mimicking case about the styrofoam dish, reversing Fara’s 
previous verdict: the new version claims that the styrofoam example (along with 
other mimicking cases) remains unresolved by INTRINSIC: 
[INTRINSIC] doesn’t avoid the problem of mimickers. The styrofoam dish, if struck, 
would break by the mimicking operation of the Hater of Styrofoam. Note that, if 
struck, the dish would retain for a sufficient time an intrinsic property, say, the 
microstructure responsible for its distinctive sound and, further, this intrinsic prop-
erty would be a cause of the breaking. The prediction by [INTRINSIC] is therefore 
that the styrofoam dish is disposed to break when struck, which might be claimed 
to be counterintuitive. (Choi–Fara 2012: section 1.4.)
The reason why Choi and Fara think the styrofoam example remains a problem 
for INTRINSIC parallels exactly the objection I had formulated about the chalice: 
given the presence of the Hater of Styrofoam, there is some intrinsic property 
of the styrofoam dish giving rise to the sound that the Hater loathes and caus-
ing the dish to break (at the hands of the Hater), say Choi and Fara; given the 
presence of the vengeful angel, there is some intrinsic property of the chalice 
that inspires the angel’s wrath, causing the chalice to break (given the angel’s 
intervention), say I.
So far, compared to SIMPLE, INTRINSIC hasn’t made any headway on the coun-
terexamples (coming up in Section 4); before moving on to Lehrer-analog coun-
terexamples with which INTRINSIC does help, let us take a closer look at the 
counterexamples now on the table. 
Just how common are masking and mimicking cases? Certainly, the mimick-
ing examples about angelic wrath over a chalice and about the Styrofoam Hater 
both seem rather exotic. Fara (2005: 76, 81) mentions mimicking cases in pass-
ing only, but stresses that masking cases need not be extraordinary: 
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It is worth noticing that masking is a commonplace phenomenon: dispositions of 
objects are being masked all the time. I’m disposed to go to sleep when I’m tired; 
but this disposition is sometimes masked by too much street noise. Cylinders of 
rubber are disposed to roll when placed on an inclined plane; but this disposition 
can be masked by applying a car’s break. A piece of wood in a vacuum chamber is 
no less disposed to burn when heated than is its aerated counterpart (if dispositions 
are intrinsic properties, then this has to be granted); but wood won’t burn when 
heated in a vacuum. The masking of dispositions is such a humdrum occurrence 
that any adequate account of disposition ascriptions must accommodate it. (Fara 
2005: 50.)
Notice a key conceptual connection between the mimicking and masking cases 
discussed above: they are two sides of the same coin in that the fragile cup with 
protective packaging has its fragility masked, meanwhile, because of the packag-
ing, the cup mimicks non-fragility. And because of the angel’s wrath, the gold 
chalice mimicks fragility, meanwhile, its non-fragile nature is masked by the an-
gel’s wrath. Mimicking cases, then, are no more exotic than masking cases. For nu-
merous scenarios in which a disposition is masked, a corresponding opposite dis-
position is being mimicked and vice versa: toxicity/malleability masked amounts to 
non-toxicity/non-malleability mimicked and vice versa; toxicity/malleability mim-
icked amounts to non-toxicity/non-malleability masked and vice versa. So if mask-
ing cases are commonplace, as Fara suggests, then so too are mimicking cases.
Not all possible examples work this way. Consider a cup made of melamine 
resin: a kind of hard plastic that is considerably less breakable than glass or por-
celain, but which is still somewhat breakable. Suppose that a melamine cup is 
such that it would survive some (regular, household-style) dropping events but 
not all of them. Then the melamine cup is neither fragile nor non-fragile: it is 
both false that if it were dropped it would break and that if it were dropped 
it wouldn’t break. The cup is in-between with respect to fragility. Now imagine a 
scenario in which our vengeful angel specializes in the melamine cup, mak-
ing sure it breaks when dropped. This is a case of fragility mimicked without 
non-fragility being masked. Imagine another scenario in which partial protective 
packaging is put on a porcelain cup, so it doesn’t become non-fragile but about 
as sturdy as a melamine cup. Then the porcelain cup’s fragility has been masked 
without non-fragility being mimicked. 
(Another example of in-between status: suppose Huoranszki owns a trekking 
bike, which he rides around the city, and a road bike for countryside outings. It 
is not the case that Huoranszki is disposed to take his trekking bike when riding 
a bicycle; nor is it the case that he is disposed to not take his trekking bike when 
riding a bicycle. For this disposition–opposite disposition pair, he has neither. 
Huoranszki is in-between with respect to taking his trekking bike when he goes for a 
bicycle ride.)
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These sorts of examples do not undermine the point I have been making, for 
two reasons. On the one hand, the examples discussed in the dispositions de-
bates aren’t like the in-between cases. Indeed, to get a really compelling mask-
ing case, it helps to go all the way: mask fragility in such a way that the object 
never breaks. And the same goes for mimicking cases: a truly striking example 
has an extremely sturdy, clearly non-fragile object (like the gold chalice) that 
mimics fragility due to an extrinsic factor like the vengeful angel. On the other 
hand, there are still plenty of pairs of dispositions and their opposites for which 
the conceptual connection I have been describing is in place and that suffices 
for my point that masking and mimicking cases do, to a large extent, overlap. 
To underscore this point about how common it is that masking cases are at once 
mimicking cases of the opposite disposition and vice versa, consider that more 
specific conditions of manifestation alter in-between status: our melamine cup 
is disposed to break when dropped from a sufficient height, say 20 meters, and 
it is not disposed to stay intact when dropped from 20 meters. And Huoranszki 
is disposed to take his trekking bike when riding a bicycle in town, and he is 
disposed to leave his trekking bike at home when riding a bicycle out of town. 
In what follows, I will focus on examples of disposition ascriptions in which the 
subject has in-between status with respect to neither the disposition in question 
nor its opposite.
That mimicking and masking cases go hand in hand indicates a further con-
nection between the counterexamples: in the dispositions literature, the anti-ne-
cessity T–F counterexamples about a disposition (fragility, toxicity, malleability) masked 
are at once anti-sufficiency F–T counterexamples about an opposite disposition (non- 
fragility, toxicity, non-malleability) mimicked, and the other way round. 
In the light of this, it is curious that Fara (2009: section 2.3) sees an asymmetry 
between the two types of cases with respect to INTRINSIC, which, according to 
him, “avoids the problem of ‘mimicking’” but “does not help with the problem 
of masking”. After all, if INTRINSIC stumbles on the packaging material masking 
fragility (a T–F counterexample), then it also stumbles on the packaging mate-
rial mimicking non-fragility (an F–T counterexample). And if INTRINSIC suc-
cessfully handles the chalice case as one in which fragility is mimicked (an F–T 
counterexample), it would at once handle a case of non-fragility being masked 
(a T–F counterexample). After all (reverting, for simplicity, to SIMPLE for a mo-
ment), being disposed to b if d is analyzed as b-ing if d were the case, while the 
opposite disposition—being disposed to not-b if d—is analyzed as not-b-ing if d 
were the case (substitute, say, ‘break’ for b and something like ‘being dropped’ 
for d); now, for INTRINSIC (and also for SIMPLE), we can produce substitution pairs 
that differ only in that one has b throughout in place of M, while the other has 
not-b, while the two substitution instances are alike in truth value and describe 
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the exact same scenario (for example, fragility masked/non-fragility mimicked 
or fragility mimicked/non-fragility masked).7
Someone might object that the symmetry I’m drawing between masking and 
mimicking cases relies on there being, for each dispositional predicate of the 
form ‘disposed to M under C’ a dispositional predicate of the form ‘disposed to 
not-M under C’, an unwarranted assumption. To this objection I have four re-
sponses. First, even if fragility/non-fragility were an isolated pair of dispositions 
for which we could reformulate a mimicking case as a masking case, one could 
no longer claim that INTRINSIC successfully handles mimicks but not masks, as 
Fara (2009) does; after all, some scenarios would be at once masking cases of one 
disposition and mimicking cases of the opposite disposition. Second, whatever 
metaphysical reasons someone might have for denying that for every disposi-
tion there is an opposite that is also a disposition, the burden of proof is on her 
side to show this; and even if she managed to show this, it is unclear if such a 
metaphysical claim about dispositions would cast doubt on the ascription of a 
negative disposition. Third, the metaphysical project just mentioned is compli-
cated by the fact that formulating the positive/negative disposition distinction is 
nontrivial given that not breaking when dropped seems equivalent to remaining 
intact when dropped. Then it is not at all obvious which of this pair would be 
the positive and which the negative disposition: the disposition to break (that 
is, the disposition not to remain intact) or the disposition to remain intact (that 
is, the disposition not to break). One option that suggests itself is that positive 
dispositions, unlike negative ones, are about undergoing some sort of drastic 
change (like dissolving, shattering) when the condition of manifestation obtains. 
(Defining what counts as drastic change and what doesn’t is already nontrivial.) 
But it is not obvious that this will work either, given examples like being heat 
resistant or sound proof, which seem like clear candidates for dispositions, yet 
objects that have them remain (largely) unchanged when the manifestation con-
ditions obtain. Fourth, it does seem perfectly clear that for a broad range of dis-
positional predicates, their opposites are dispositional predicates also (fragility, 
malleability, water-solubility, to name but a few); if so, then if masking cases 
aren’t exotic then mimicking cases aren’t either; at the very least, many mimick-
ing cases aren’t as outlandish as the angel and styrofoam examples might lead 
us to believe. 
If we go all the way and claim that for all disposition ascriptions there is a cor-
responding ascription of the opposite disposition, then we may still think that 
7  There are two further options for substitution pairs (for the examples that aren’t 
in-between dispositions): the case of an ordinary porcelain cup gives rise to two true 
biconditionals, one with both halves true, T–T (… disposed to break when dropped…), the 
other with both halves false F–F (…disposed not to break when dropped…). The same holds 
for the case of an ordinary gold chalice, except the “…disposed to break…” biconditional 
yields F–F, while the “…disposed to not break…” biconditional yields T–T. 
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there are two separate types of problems that the chalice and the packaged cup 
present. But crucially, the philosophically interesting dimension of difference 
between them is not that
o the chalice presents a mimicking case while the packaged cup presents a 
masking one; or 
o the chalice presents an anti-sufficiency counterexample while the pack-
aged cup presents an anti-necessity one; in other words,
o the chalice presents an F–T counterexample while the packaged cup pre-
sents a T–F one.
The reader might wonder if such basic points—about logical and conceptual 
connections between the masking and mimicking cases—are worth making. But 
when considering the dispositions debate (as we have done), it becomes clear 
that these points have fallen into disregard and iterating them clarifies matters. 
We will shortly recognize their relevance in the context of Huoranszki’s appeal 
to the analogy between the analysis of free will and that of disposition ascrip-
tions. 
We have so far considered two conditional analyses of disposition ascriptions, 
SIMPLE and INTRINSIC, and found that neither can handle the cases with the chal-
ice, the styrofoam cup or the packaged cup. In the next section we will consider 
yet another pair of counterexamples to SIMPLE, and uncover parallels between 
the free will and the dispositions debates. 
4. CONDITIONALS AND FINKISH DISPOSITIONS: FREE WILL REVISITED
In the previous section, we came to the conclusion that what are called masking 
and mimicking cases are quite commonplace. For over half a century, another 
pair of unusual-seeming counterexamples has received extensive attention in 
the dispositions literature: examples of so-called finkish dispositions, due to C. 
B. Martin (his examples appeared in print much later, in 1994). A finkish dispo-
sition “would straight away vanish if put to the test… A finkishly fragile thing 
is fragile, sure enough, so long as it is not struck. But if it were struck, it would 
straight away cease to be fragile, and it would not break” (Lewis 1997: 144).
Let’s say that a wire is live when it is disposed to conduct electricity, and 
dead when it is not so disposed. Now consider a dead wire that is finkishly dead: 
its deadness “cops out” or finks out precisely when its condition of manifesta-
tion—being touched by a conductor—occurs:
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The wire … is connected to a machine, an electro-fink, which can provide itself 
with reliable information as to exactly when a wire connected to it is touched by a 
conductor. When such contact occurs the electro-fink reacts … by making the wire 
live for the duration of the contact. In the absence of contact the wire is dead. … In 
sum, the electro-fink ensures that the wire is live when and only when the conduc-
tor touches it. (Martin 1994: 2–3; emphasis in the original.)
Call this the electro-fink case. 
Consider also a live wire that is finkishly live: with the electro-fink operating in 
reverse cycle, “the wire is dead when and only when a conductor touches it” 
(Martin 1994: 3). Call this the reverse-cycle electro-fink case.
The electro-fink and the reverse electro-fink examples have it in common 
that they involve wires with dispositions that disappear just as their manifesta-
tion conditions obtain. These examples aren’t as exotic as they might first seem: 
George Molnar (1999) draws attention to the fact that reverse electro-finks are 
quite common, in the form of fuses—metal bits that melt in order to interrupt 
excessive electric current. 
And the electro-fink and similar examples bring us right back to an exact par-
allel to Lehrer’s counterexample to clause (i) of the conditional analysis of free 
will. Huoranszki (2011: 61, 63) discusses Goldman’s (1970: 199–200) example 
of a finkishly non-soluble sugar cube whose non-solubility “finks out”, making 
it water-soluble all of a sudden when the cube is immersed in water. Then the 
following is true of the cube, c: “If c is not immersed in water, it is not soluble” 
or, equivalently, “c is soluble only if it is immersed in water”, or, equivalently, 
“If c is soluble, then it is immersed in water”. As far as appearances go, the cube 
behaves just like a soluble sugar cube, yet it is not soluble. Let us see how the 
Lehrer-analog objection to the SIMPLE analysis of disposition ascriptions goes, 
formulated in terms of the electro-fink case:
First step. (1ƍ), (2ƍ) and (3ƍ) hold for the electro-fink case’s finkishly dead wire i.
(1ƍ) i is live iff it is touched by a conductor; this has two parts:
(1ƍa) i is live only if it is touched by a conductor. 
(1ƍb) i is live if it is touched by a conductor. 
(2ƍ) i is not touched by a conductor.
(3ƍ) If i were touched by a conductor, it would conduct electricity. 
 
Second step. From (1ƍa) and (2ƍ), the modus tollens inference schema yields (4ƍ): 
(4ƍ) i is not live.
58 ARE WE FREE AFTER ALL? READING HUORANSZKI
Third step. (3ƍ) states that i satisfies the left hand side of SIMPLE. 
Fourth step. An object like i shows SIMPLE’s clause (I) to be insufficient to de-
fine disposition ascriptions, for i satisfies (I) (according to (3ƍ) above), yet i is not 
live (according to (4ƍ) above). Hence with the electro-fink case, for the dispositional 
predicate ‘is live’, we have a Lehrer-analog anti-sufficiency F–T counterexample to the 
SIMPLE conditional analysis of disposition ascriptions.
Let’s say that quasi-mimicking/-masking a property involves mimicking/
masking a property when the object’s realization conditions don’t obtain with-
out mimicking/masking it when the realization conditions do obtain. 
The wire i quasi-mimicks being live when it is actually dead. Just as the fink-
ishly non-soluble sugar cube described above quasi-mimicks being soluble. To 
put it differently, i’s being a dead wire is quasi-masked when it is touched by a 
conductor. And the sugar cube’s non-solubility is quasi-masked when it is im-
mersed in water. This sounds very much like the chalice and the styrofoam 
examples we considered above as mimicking cases. Indeed, the electro-fink and 
the mimicking cases are similar apart from one key respect: the gold chalice and 
the styrofoam cup are fragile all along, before and after the manifestation con-
dition for fragility—being dropped or struck—transpires; by contrast, the wire 
i is dead before being subjected to the electro-fink and live after. Hence, with 
the electro-fink case, for the dispositional predicate ‘is dead’, we have a Lehrer-analog 
anti-necessity T–F counterexample to the SIMPLE conditional analysis of disposition as-
criptions.
The reverse electro-fink case involves a live wire (a fuse!) whose disposition 
is removed—quasi-masked—by the reverse electro-fink. This bears similarity 
to masking-type cases like the packaged porcelain cup, the key difference be-
ing that the cup remains fragile when surviving the drop in one piece, while the 
reverse-electro-finked wire stops being live as soon as a conductor touches it. 
Notice, though, that (just as before) the reverse-electro-finked wire can also be 
construed as an object that quasi-mimicks being dead. 
We can now see that David Lewis’s proposed INTRINSIC (replacing SIMPLE) is, 
by adding clause (II), custom tailored to handle the electro-fink and reverse electro-fink 
cases. Here is why. Clause (II) specifies an additional subjunctive antecedent: for 
an object/substance/person N and for an intrinsic property of N B, “if N were to 
retain B for a sufficient time”. This clause takes care of the electro-fink case pre-
cisely because in actuality, the wire in question doesn’t retain its disposition of 
being dead when touched by a conductor; and if one thinks (along with Lewis) 
that dispositions are an intrinsic matter, then she expects that the wire has some 
intrinsic property responsible for its deadness, a disposition that the wire would 
lose when it is touched by a conductor. This way, a scenario most similar to 
actuality in which (I) holds is one in which (II) does not obtain. By considering 
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scenarios most similar to actuality in which both clauses obtain, we are looking at 
a different set of possible worlds than before, and in none of those worlds is the 
wire electro-finked. The reverse electro-fink case is handled in much the same 
way for the very same reason: the situations most similar to actuality in which 
the reverse-electro-finked live wire is touched by a conductor, are ones in which 
(II) does not obtain; the wire does not remain live; worlds most similar to the 
actual one in which both (I) and (II) obtain form a different set, none of whose 
members feature the reverse electro-fink on the wire. 
At this point, we have come back to the connection between free will and 
dispositions: recall that Huoranszki (2011: 61) views accounts of dispositions as 
analyzing powers/abilities, and being free to act otherwise as a specific appli-
cation of that analysis to a special power/ability. Further, Huoranszki, below, 
suggests that problems with SIMPLE indicate why MOORE’s clause (i) should be 
supplemented with clause (ii):
  
[Lehrer’s] objection is correct exactly because the simple conditional analysis [of 
free will] is mistaken. The analogy between the Lehrer-Goldman debate about the 
analysis of our ability to perform an actually unperformed action on the one hand 
and the problem of finkish dispositions on the other is the key to understand how 
the original Moorean analysis can be revised and made correct. As [examples about 
finkish dispositions show], the [SIMPLE] conditional analysis fails because how objects 
(or agents) would behave in specific circumstances is not sufficient to grant them a power 
or ability. Our definition must also include a clause saying that they do not lose or 
acquire that ability when the circumstances in which the disposition is about to 
become manifest obtain. (Huoranszki 2011: 63; my emphasis. Zs. Z.) 
I am sympathetic to Huoranszki’s final conclusion. Moreover, I think it carries 
interesting implications for the dispositions debate for reasons that are consider-
ably more decisive than what is given in this passage: I will spell them out at the 
end of this section. 
I disagree with Huoranszki on an intermediate step, italicized above. It should 
read: “how objects would behave in specific circumstances is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to grant them a power or ability”. After all, the electro-fink case (as well 
as its reverse counterpart) can be construed simultaneously as anti-sufficiency as 
well as anti-necessity counterexamples. And even if we don’t call a wire’s being 
dead a disposition (a questionable assumption to begin with, as I argued in the 
previous section), one of the finkish dispositions—the reverse electro-fink case 
with the live wire turning dead when touched by a conductor—is still an anti-
necessity counterexample to SIMPLE. 
In addition, calling for a supplementary condition to MOORE’s (i) in the way 
that Huoranszki does in this passage is not an ordinary case of a definition be-
ing too broad, suffering from insufficiency, in need of being narrowed by one 
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or more additional conditions—along the lines of first “defining” ‘zucchini’ too 
broadly as a type of summer squash but (since the condition is satisfied by vari-
ous squashes that aren’t zucchini, such as the acorn squash) subsequently nar-
rowing it by adding conditions like ‘cylindrical in shape’ or ‘usually green’. Us-
ing this model for what clause (ii) is doing ignores the fact that the second half 
of the biconditional in HUORANSZKI does not merely list narrowing conditions: 
instead, it consists of a past subjunctive conditional whose antecedent is being supple-
mented with additional conditions (similarly to the move from SIMPLE to INTRINSIC). 
But that does something other than narrowing the second half of the bicondi-
tional: it narrows it in some respects and broadens it in others (similarly to when 
we added clause (II) to SIMPLE). This is also shown by the fact that in the case 
of finkish dispositions, adding an analog of Huoranszki’s clause (ii) to SIMPLE 
would simultaneously take care of both the anti-sufficiency and the anti-necessity 
counterexamples, both the electro-fink and the reverse electro-fink case:
NONREDUCTIVE conditional account of disposition ascriptions
An object/person/substance N is disposed to M under C iff
 N would M if 
(I) it were the case that C, and 
(IIƍ) N were to retain its disposition to M when C for a sufficient time.
Here is why NONREDUCTIVE is not simply further narrowing the right hand 
side of SIMPLE. With respect to the disposition of being live, the electro-finked 
dead wire i no longer presents an anti-sufficiency F–T counterexample because 
we are considering only those (counterfactual) scenarios in which i is touched 
by a conductor (by I), and the electro-fink no longer interferes with i’s originally 
dead disposition (by IIƍ); the biconditional’s second half claims that, among these 
situations, the scenarios most similar to the actual world all have i conducting 
electricity. Crucially, the set of most similar worlds is not a narrowing down, a 
subset of the set selected by (I) alone (as in SIMPLE). And, with respect to the 
disposition of being live, the reverse-electro-finked live wire iƍ no longer pre-
sents an anti-necessity T–F counterexample, because we are considering only 
those (counterfactual) scenarios in which iƍ is touched by a conductor (by I), and 
the reverse electro-fink no longer interferes with iƍ’s originally live disposition (by 
IIƍ); and among those, the scenarios most similar to the actual world all have iƍ 
conducting electricity. As before, crucially, the set of most similar worlds is not a 
narrowing down or a subset of the set selected by (I) alone (as in SIMPLE). 
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NONREDUCTIVE is special in that the analysis in the second half itself includes 
the very disposition to be analyzed.8 HUORANSZKI is another instance of a nonre-
ductive analysis in which the very ability to perform an actually unperformed ac-
tion, the ability/power to act otherwise, is featured in the analysis. Huoranszki (2011: 
68–71) considers this nonreductive feature of his proposal; we’ll do the same in 
the upcoming section. Beforehand, let’s consider how NONREDUCTIVE (inspired 
by HUORANSZKI’s clause (ii)) clarifies some of the issues surrounding the analysis 
of disposition ascriptions. 
Notice that NONREDUCTIVE does not resolve the scenarios with the packaged 
porcelain cup, the styrofoam cup or the golden chalice: as things stand, all three 
remain counterexamples.9 In this respect, just like INTRINSIC, NONREDUCTIVE 
seems custom tailored to handle the finkish cases.10 Clearly, those who want 
to defend this account have to say something further about these outstanding 
problem cases. Why think NONREDUCTIVE is a step in the right direction then? 
Problems arising in connection with a recent proposal that received consider-
able attention—Michael Fara’s (2005) so-called habitual analysis, which aimed 
to counter the weak points of INTRINSIC—confronts problems that make the in-
clusion of something like (IIƍ) seem highly attractive. 
Habitual claims—like “Mary smokes when she gets home from work” or 
“Huoranszki rides a bike to work”—“have something to do with what is nor-
mally, or typically, or generally the case” (Fara 2005: 64). Nonetheless, Fara insists 
that we shouldn’t analyze them in terms of conditionals with an adverbial prefix 
like “Normally, if Huoranszki goes to work, he rides a bike”.
Fara (2005) proposes that instead of using conditionals to give an analysis of dis-
positions we should use what he calls habituals. Habituals are a commonplace de-
vice for characterizing how an object habitually behaves. [Huoranszki rides a bike 
8  Bird (1998) and Molnar (1999) are prominent proponents of nonreductive analyses of 
disposition ascriptions.
9  After all, the chalice and the styrofoam cup actually retain their nonfragility (and the 
packaged cup its fragility), and are actually dropped, yet in the actual world, they break 
(don’t break). So the counterfactual’s antecedent conditions hold for the actual world while 
the consequent doesn’t. This is not surprising given that clause (IIƍ) of NONREDUCTIVE (in 
parallel with INTRINSIC) is custom-tailored to handle cases in which a disposition is lost/gained 
precisely when the realization condition is about to obtain. This is a feature that the finkish 
examples have but the cup examples lack.
10  Of course, these sorts of problems don’t arise in the context of the free will debate, in 
which mimick-type cases don’t seem to be possible, and—depending on what we think about 
free will being compatible with some forms of the ability to act otherwise being masked—
masking-type cases might not arise either. Fara (2008)—unlike Huoranszki (if I understand 
him correctly)—does think the ability to act otherwise can be masked without removing the 
ability. 
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to work], for example, is true even if, occasionally [Huoranszki rides the tram to 
work]. In this sense, we can think of habituals as expressing universal generaliza-
tions that tolerate exceptions. (Choi–Fara 2012: section 1.4.)
Fara’s HABITUAL analysis of disposition ascriptions
An object/person N is disposed to M when C iff 
 (Iƍ) there is an intrinsic property that N has in virtue of which it Ms when C.
HABITUAL is custom-tailored to handle the masking cases: the porcelain cup is 
fragile even when on occasion it is packaged. It has an intrinsic feature in virtue 
of which it usually breaks when dropped. Fara takes this to be the analysis’ sell-
ing point: “The best reason to prefer the Habitual Account is that it can solve 
the problem of masking” (Fara 2005: 71). HABITUAL adopts from Lewis (1997) 
the inclusion of an intrinsic property. The account is successful at handling all 
counterexamples to SIMPLE that we have discussed: the angel’s presence around 
the gold chalice is exceptional; in the majority of the relevant scenarios (actual 
and counterfactual) in which the chalice is dropped, it doesn’t shatter, making 
the habitual “The chalice shatters when dropped” false despite the exceptions. 
Moreover, the chalice’s not breaking is a matter of its intrinsic features, so the 
disposition ascription “The chalice is fragile/disposed to shatter when dropped” 
is false according to HABITUAL, just as we wanted. Parallel explanations make 
“The styrofoam cup within earshot of the Styrofoam Hater is fragile”, “The 
electro-finked wire is live” likewise false, and “The reverse-electro-finked wire 
is live” true. All promising results so far. But HABITUAL faces profound problems.
Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (2010) forcefully argues that despite Fara’s insistence that 
his is a non-conditional analysis, HABITUAL is logically equivalent to a ceteris pari-
bus conditional analysis like the following:
Ceteris Paribus (CP) conditional analysis of disposition ascriptions
An object/person/substance N is disposed to M under C iff
 ceteris paribus N would M if 
 (I) it were the case that C.
The idea is that an object is disposed to break when dropped just in case, other 
things being equal, the object would break if dropped. Such a modification of 
SIMPLE is supposed to exclude exactly those cases that are counterexamples to 
SIMPLE: masking, mimicking, electro-fink and reverse electro-fink cases. But the 
move to CP renders the analysis vacuous, claim C. B. Martin (1994: 5–6) and Yli-
Vakkuri (2010: 664–665). For the way to understand CP is that it is supposed to 
exclude all cases that are counterexamples to SIMPLE. But what such cases have 
in common is no more than that they are counterexamples to SIMPLE. So if Yli-
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Vakkuri is right that HABITUAL reduces to CP, then the former is just as vacuous 
as the latter. 
There are two further considerations of my own that also point in the direc-
tion that HABITUAL is ultimately vacuous: Fara’s remarks about the context sen-
sitivity of HABITUAL on the one hand, and about so-called entrenched finks on 
the other. We’ll consider these in turn. 
First, Fara (2005: 74–76) imagines that the porcelain cup is an extremely valu-
able museum piece that specialists have carefully packaged; suppose the pack-
aging is invisible. A vandal is determined to break the cup, does not know about 
the packaging, and deploys all manners of destruction but does not succeed. 
Exasperated, he says
(5) The damn cup just doesn’t break when struck!
The museum specialists respond:
 
(6) Oh, but it does break when struck (that’s why we protected it in the first 
place). 
How can both the vandal’s and the specialists’ utterance be true? Fara’s response: 
“the cup does have an intrinsic property—say its weak molecular bonding—in 
virtue of which, if the museum specialists were to utter (6), they would speak truly” 
(Fara 2005: 76; emphases in the original). Meanwhile, Fara is suggesting that in 
the context of the vandal’s utterance, this particular property will not make the 
second half of HABITUAL true, nor will any other intrinsic property of the cup’s. 
But why exactly is that the case? Fara gives no explanation apart from saying 
that (5) in the vandal’s mouth seems true and that context dependence can al-
low for (5) and (6) being simultaneously true, in the same way that two people 
can simultaneously make true utterances by one saying “I am happy” and the 
other “I’m not happy”. But that does not explain how the vandal’s utterance 
comes out true rather than false according to HABITUAL.
Second, Fara (2005: 76–78) makes a distinction between transient versus en-
trenched finks. A transiently finkish wire is attached to the electro-fink only 
“temporarily, or rarely, or sporadically”. Fara gives two examples of entrenched 
finkishness:
Imagine that the copper wire, when placed in the circuit, is immediately attached 
to the [reverse electro-] fink, perhaps as a safety precaution… We might say that 
being attached to the fink is a “way of life” for the wire. This would be a case of 
entrenched finkishness. … If being attached to such a device is a way of life for the 
wire, then it seems absurd to say that the wire is disposed to conduct electricity 
when touched by a conductor… 
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[s]uppose a sturdy wooden barrel, which we might ordinarily describe as being 
disposed to roll when pushed, is nailed to the floor of a seafood restaurant, to add to 
the restaurant’s nautical décor. We can imagine that the barrel has been on display 
in the restaurant for several years, and that it regularly resists attempts of drunken 
patrons to roll it by pushing. Again, it seems clear that this barrel, unlike most oth-
ers, is not disposed to roll when pushed; instead it is disposed to stay perfectly still 
when pushed, as the unsuccessful attempts of the drunken patrons attest. (Fara 
2005: 77–78; italics in the original, my underlining. Zs. Z.)
The underlined parts highlight Fara’s appeal to what he considers decisive 
linguistic intuitions to the effect that the wire with the entrenched reverse-elec-
tro-fink is not disposed to conduct electricity, and that the nailed-down barrel is 
not disposed to roll when pushed, so (7) is false. 
(7) The barrel is disposed to roll when pushed.
Fara claims that HABITUAL yields just this verdict: despite intrinsic features of 
the wire and the barrel, the right hand side of the biconditional comes out false 
due to the enduring extrinsic finks—because the wire’s not conducting electric-
ity is not an exception but the rule for that particular wire (given the entrenched 
fink); and because the barrel’s not rolling is likewise not an exception but the 
rule for that particular barrel. 
I see a problem with Fara’s take on the cases of entrenched finkishness. It 
is unclear that HABITUAL makes the barrel’s immobility unexceptional; that de-
pends on what the range of relevant scenarios is among which immobility is un-
exceptional. But as we saw in the previous paragraph, utterances of disposition 
ascriptions are context-sensitive, so we can imagine, besides the false utterance 
Fara is highlighting, a true utterance of (7) in the case of entrenched finkishness 
(the same way we had imagined the vandal and the museum specialists). So 
somehow the range of relevant scenarios in the two contexts has to be such that 
immobility is exceptional in the case of the true utterance but unexceptional 
in the case of the false one. There is, however, no guidance whatsoever from 
HABITUAL as to how we might achieve this other than by fiat: for each utterance, 
the range, whatever it is, has to be such that the truth value comes out right. But 
that is just as vacuous as saying that an utterance is true when it’s true and false 
when it’s false.
In sum, there are several reasons to think HABITUAL is vacuous. The account 
can accommodate any intuition (putative or real) about utterances involving 
disposition ascriptions; but such extreme flexibility breeds lack of explanatory 
power. 
The possibility of entrenched finkishness has implications that go beyond 
HABITUAL. Recall that it had seemed as though INTRINSIC was making headway 
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with the finkish cases even if not the others (the chalice and the packaged cup). 
But if we grant the intuitions Fara is appealing to in the entrenched finkishness 
cases—admitting that (7) is false when said about a barrel whose “way of life” 
is being nailed down in a restaurant—then we have undermined INTRINSIC. For 
the very idea behind INTRINSIC had been that disposition ascriptions are an in-
trinsic matter and extrinsic features, whether they be transient or entrenched, 
make no difference to what dispositions the object in question does or doesn’t 
have. This way, what hope of progress INTRINSIC brought relative to SIMPLE is 
tarnished.
To be sure, NONREDUCTIVE is still susceptible to counterexamples like the 
chalice and the packaged porcelain cup. Yet in the light of the shortcomings of 
various reductive analyses of disposition ascriptions (SIMPLE, INTRINSIC, HABITU-
AL), NONREDUCTIVE is showing renewed promise: at the very least, it can handle 
finkish cases across the board, be they transient or entrenched. 
 
5. WHY NONREDUCTIVE DOESN’T MEAN NONSTARTER
Is a nonreductive analysis of free will such as HUORANSZKI worth having? Huoran-
szki (2011: section 1.4) gives an affirmative answer, claiming that the reference 
to ability retention in clause (ii) …
…is innocent and does not make our analysis viciously circular. The second oc-
currence of the ability in the analysans stipulates only that whatever the analysan-
dum refers to will not be altered by the circumstances that the analysans specifies. 
And this can be included in the specification of the circumstances among which 
the ability would become manifest without making the analysis uninformative. 
(Huoranszki 2011: 68.)
Shortly after, Huoranszki claims that a nonreductive analysis is the only one 
worth having, and suggests that the reasons for this are illuminated by the prob-
lems that reductive analyses of disposition ascriptions encounter: 
My version of the conditional analysis does not aim to provide a reductive analy-
sis of the abilities relevant for freedom of the will. In fact, I do not think that 
any such analysis is worth seeking or can be given. To see why, let me compare 
again my analysis of free will to the analysis of dispositions. A reductive analysis 
of dispositions would require that we analyze the meaning of every power which 
can be (truly) ascribed to an object in terms of occurrent and/or categorical proper-
ties. However, I doubt that any such analysis is possible at least for two reasons. 
(Huoranszki 2011: 69.) 
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Huoranszki’s second reason is that in spelling out the appropriate manifestation 
conditions for a dispositional notion like fragility (a kind of power), we inevita-
bly resort to including powers in our analysis. For example, it won’t do to say 
that a fragile object is one that would break if it were struck; we need to say 
something like “if it were struck by a hard object”. Such an analysis of fragility is 
illuminating even though it involves hardness (another power). We can appreci-
ate this point even more if we consider in-between objects like the neither frag-
ile nor non-fragile melamine cup which does have more specific dispositions, 
like being disposed to break when dropped with a certain minimum speed/from 
a certain minimum height, etc.
Part of Huoranszki’s first reason is that accounts in terms of intrinsic proper-
ties (like INTRINSIC and HABITUAL) are problematic because it is doubtful that 
every disposition is intrinsic.11 The intuitions surrounding entrenched finkish-
ness cases—(7) being false—provide further support for this claim. 
I concur with Huoranszki’s conclusion: it is unlikely that disposition ascrip-
tions are susceptible to a reductive analysis. But the reasons I spelled out in 
this paper are distinct from Huoranszki’s. When it comes to disposition ascrip-
tions, we can hope to handle finkish cases along the lines of INTRINSIC. Masking 
and mimicking cases—related in a crucial way that is not usually recognized in 
the literature—might move us towards HABITUAL. But then we are faced with 
cases of entrenched finkishness undermining not only HABITUAL but also cast-
ing doubt on what INTRINSIC had achieved. The way out seems to take us in the 
same nonreductive direction that Huoranszki’s clause (ii) does.12
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